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***Please note: This article is part of a dossier on the impact of rising populism on climate efforts in Europe. For more details on the transition in Poland, check out our Guide to Poland ***

A 鈥渧ictory over populism鈥� 鈥� this is how Poland鈥檚 election results were at the end of last year. The parties in the government coalition formed by former European Council president Donald Tusk shared a pro-Europe stance and were heavily critical of the populist, right-wing Law and Justice party (PiS) that had ruled Poland since 2015. Many voters, experts and civil society also took the arrival of ambitious climate action and environmental protection as a given, following neglect or even obstruction by PiS.

But the new government鈥檚 first few months in office have already dashed many of these hopes. Tusk shocked many activists by not only , but also dithering over ambitious EU emission-cutting targets, and even rolling back the previous government鈥檚 plans for a tax on polluting cars. How could it have come to this?

It鈥檚 looking increasingly likely that the fear of right-wing populism - in parliament and in the streets 鈥� could be enough to stall ambitious climate policy. The populists might have left the government but their influence continues to be felt.听

鈥淭he new government decided to step back out of fear of social anger and discontent over the EU Green Deal policies," says Micha艂 Hetma艅ski, CEO of Instrat Foundation, a think tank dealing with strategic policy, including on climate.

Right-wing populist parties have scored significant electoral successes in Europe in recent years, and populist parties opposing strong climate action are expected to score well in two-thirds of EU member states at the European Parliament elections in June this year. The case of Poland听holds interesting lessons for other countries, because it was ruled for eight years by the populist party PiS.

Perhaps the first indication that Tusk鈥檚 government could bow to the pressure of populism, and might not become a climate champion after all, was the commotion over the first visit of Urszula Zieli艅ska, vice-minister for climate and the environment, in Brussels. Zieli艅ska, a politician from the Green Party, which forms part of Tusk鈥檚 Civic Coalition (KO), appeared to support a new EU target of reducing emissions by 90 percent by 2040 in the bloc, which was immediately . But the Warsaw government quickly backtracked. Zieli艅ska鈥檚 boss, environment minister Paulina Hennig-Kloska from the Poland 2050 party (whose name is a nod to the EU鈥檚 climate neutrality target year), said that this 鈥渨as not the government鈥檚 official position鈥� and Zieli艅ska . In the meantime, politicians from the populist right were and the government for 鈥渃limate fanaticism鈥�.

This was followed by a discussion about the transformation of the mobility sector - a hot topic in Poland. The new government says - in to Poland鈥檚 National Energy and Climate Plan - that it is 鈥渋mpossible鈥� for the country to meet the EU鈥檚 renewable energy target in the transport sector. But despite the shortfall, the new coalition wants to scrap plans for a tax on combustion engine car owners, which was proposed by the PiS in Poland鈥檚

The shift of the Poland 2050 party, which started off with a and is part of Tusk鈥檚 broad coalition ranging from centre right to centre left, is particularly remarkable. Just a few years ago, the party wrote in its climate strategy that taxes and bans are at least worth considering to accelerate the transition in mobility. Now 听that there would be a public backlash if they favour a new levy on car owners (even though Poland is one of few EU countries ).

The rhetoric of the party鈥檚 leader Szymon Ho艂ownia is striking in this regard, as it is highly reminiscent of far-right populists: 鈥淚t boggles the mind that PiS put a tax on ownership of combustion engine cars into the EU National Recovery Plan. This tax will not be introduced (...). Green deal? Yes, but made for the people and by incentives, not orders and bans,鈥� Ho艂ownia recently tweeted.

The strongest sign yet that Poland鈥檚 new government might not entirely abandon PiS鈥� opposition to EU climate and environmental policy was its pushback against the EU Nature Restoration Law. Tusk followed in the populists鈥� footsteps by saying that his government will not support it by abstaining from the vote, the legislation 鈥渨ill probably be blocked鈥� by this move. A final vote on the law was postponed - partly because of Poland鈥檚 decision - and the bill鈥檚 future remains uncertain. Farmers protests are a key reason for the government鈥檚 decision. Much like other parts of Europe, Poland faced huge protests by farmers in early 2024, and the climate ministry as one of the reasons for not supporting the bill.

These controversies might turn out to be a mere foretaste of what鈥檚 in store for Polish energy and climate policy, as far bigger issues could be ahead. The government will have to deal with miners facing the closure of coal pits; new burdens on consumers with the next phase of European emissions trading for buildings and transport (EU ETS 2); new EU emission reduction targets for cars; as well as building renovations including targets from the EU鈥檚 Energy Performance and Buildings Directive (EPBD), which introduces sweeping changes aimed at cutting emissions, and is to stir anger against the EU and climate policy.

The government鈥檚 climate policy actions so far, as well as the rhetoric of its members, suggest that it believes it needs to proceed slowly in order to avoid growing protests, and avoid the risk of losing out at the ballot to far-right populists who could try to scrap the Green Deal altogether, or even attempt to leave the EU. Some parties to the right of PiS demand just that: Suwerenna Polska, which was part of the PiS government, wanted to get rid of the EU ETS, while the extreme right Konfederacja supported leaving the EU.

Is having a slow, unambitious climate policy - or none at all - the only choices that Poland (and perhaps the rest of Europe) has? Not necessarily, but good communication is key, says researcher Hetma艅ski of Instrat Foundation.

Public concerns regarding the EU Green Deal policies "could have been addressed through ongoing communication and dialogue,鈥� says Hetma艅ski. While it's clear that the previous conservative government had no aspirations to become a green policy leader, the new one, which claims to be Brussels-oriented 鈥渁llows itself to be pressured by short-term gains鈥�. Instead of bowing to populist pressure, ministers dealing with climate policy 鈥渟hould do their homework and prepare a well-communicated offer for groups potentially disadvantaged by the transition,鈥� said Hetma艅ski, adding that the EU's designed for contacting and supporting coal mines should be a benchmark.

Przemys艂aw Sadura, a sociologist who studies populism and , also sees miscommunication as one of the main factors contributing to the 鈥済reen backlash鈥�. 鈥淪o much has been said about fossil fuels and their effect on the climate that there is little to be gained by opposing the energy transition,鈥� he said. 鈥淏ut in agriculture and other elements of the Green Deal there is far less awareness. It will take much more work to build a foundation for accepting such policies.鈥澨�

Besides dialogue and communication, a focus on the benefits of well-designed climate policies may help overcome political divisions, suggests a by More in Common, a non-profit attempting to decrease polarisation in politics. The findings are backed up by their surveys: When asked about climate policy in general, people showed a strong polarisation, with 78 percent of Civic Coalition (Donald Tusk鈥檚 alliance) supporters and 86 percent of The Left supporters agreeing with the need to 鈥渟peed up the transition to green energy鈥�, compared to only 48 percent of PiS voters.

But support for deploying more solar and wind in order to lower energy bills in the future was far less controversial across party lines, with as much as 90 percent support among Civic Coalition voters, and 65 percent of PiS supporters. Adam Traczyk, director of More in Common Poland, drew two main conclusions from these results. Firstly, putting people at the centre of climate policy because 鈥渞educing emissions is for the climate, but cleaner, cheaper electricity is for the people鈥�. Secondly, he stressed the importance of communicating benefits, not burdens.

The new government is already trying to use a language of benefits. 鈥淣o more talk about shutting down and transitioning away. Time has come to speak of building, investing, creating a development plan for the country,鈥� climate and environment vice minister Urszula Zielinska when she presented proposals for an update of Poland鈥檚 climate plan.

But the question remains whether a new language will be enough to persuade many people, given that ambitious climate policy will most likely include taxes and bans - the least popular policies, as recent has shown.